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Crisis of the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act: A Call for the
Ghost of Major (Professor) John

Wigmore
by Amy J. McDonough*
Gregory M. Huckabee**
and
Christopher C. Gentile***

I.

INTRODUCTION

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 19901 set in motion a chain of
events that would change the world community. In the United States,
this unprovoked aggression resulted in the activation of hundreds of
thousands of military reserves and National Guard personnel in response
to the Iraqi's "naked aggression."' As the reservists prepared to enter active military service, a fifty year old law, enacted to protect servicemembers and those making the transition between civilian and military life, rose from obscurity like a phoenix. Surprise and voluminous
inquiry erupted, as a new generation of servicemembers and businessmen
*
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1. In Two Arab Capitals, Gunfire and Fear, Victory and Cheers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3,
1990, at 8.
2. R.W. Apple, Jr., Naked Aggression, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 3, 1990, at 1.
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were introduced to protections provided by the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act of 1940 (the "SSCRA").3
After the Selective Service Act ("the draft") terminated in 1973, the
Department of Defense initiated the Total Force Policy.4 The concept involved integration of the reserves with active duty combat forces. The
Reserve Component was to be trained for a wartime mission to "provide
the military with its 'surge' capacity to mobilize on short notice for a
large conflict." Over the past ten years, the military, and especially the
United States Army, has shifted more of its combat support resources
into the reserves as a fiscal saving measure.' With a current military force
structure that includes a National Guard and reserve force of approximately 1.6 million, any large-scale operation mandates their activation for
7
mission accomplishment.
The men and women who responded to the nation's needs were initially
left guessing whether they were protected from civil and legal problems
they could not attend to at home. If they went directly to the SSCRA, it
did not offer much help.8 Instead, the answer came from the legislative
history and the Department of Defense's interpretation of the SSCRA. In
addition to soldiers and sailors, referred to in the title, reservists, Na3. 50 U.S.C.A. app. J§ 501-591 (1990).
4. Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Will Call Up Combat Reserve Units, N.Y. TtMES, Nov. 5,
1990, at 10.
5. Patrick E. Tyler & Dan Balz, Bush Decides to Call Up Military Reserves; Iraq to
Hold Foreignersat Army, Civil Sites; Cheney Sees Multi-Year Commitment, WASH. POST,
Aug. 18, 1990, at 1.
6. Molly Moore, Pentagon May Request Activation of Reserves, WASH. POST, Aug. 16,
1990, at 33. Combat support resources include such career fields as transportation specialists, laundry operators, intelligence specialists, communication experts, water purification
specialists, and medical personnel. d.
7. Id. at 38, col. 1,2. Washington Post staff writer, Molly Moore, indicated strong reliance on the Reserve Component when citing statistics from Pentagon officials:
[sixty-one) percent of the Army's hospital personnel are reservists, 54 percent of
its intelligence units and 44 percent of those who haul and store ammunition.
In the Marine Corps, almost two-thirds of the fuel supply units are in the
reserves and the Air Force depends on reserve units for 35 percent of its tactical
airlift, 67 percent of its aerial medical evacuation teams and 59 percent of the
units that repair battle damage to aircraft.
Id.; see also Michael R. Gordon, U.S. May Call Up Some Reservists To Ease the Strain on
the Military, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1990, at 1.
8. 50 U.S.C. app. § 511 (1990) provides:
(1) The term "person in the military service", the term "persons in the military
service", and the term "persons in the military service of the United States", as
used in this Act, shall include the following persons and no others: All members of
the Army of the United States, the United States Navy, the Marine Corps, the
Coast Guard, and all officers of the Public Health Service detailed by proper authority for duty either with the Army or the Navy.
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tional Guard personnel,' the Air Force,10 the commissioned corps of the
Public Health Service,1" and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration1 s are covered.
This Article provides an overview of the recent 1991 amendments to
the SSCRA and focuses on the most common pitfalls in applying the SSCRA.. It also explores suggested changes to clarify the SSCRA and attempts to untangle the web of confusion surrounding its interpretations.

II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

To understand the language of the SSCRA and the intent of its provisions, a review of its growth from inception is helpful. In the United
States, the concept of providing protection to servicemembers unable to
deal with civil and legal problems at home dates back to the Civil War.1"
A.

Civil War Origins

With thousands of soldiers away fighting a war, problems predictably
arose on the homefront. Congress responded with an act that suspended
any action, civil or criminal, against federal soldiers or sailors while they
were in the service of the Union and made them immune from service of
process and arrest."' However, the act only provided temporary relief and
the soldiers or sailors returned home to face problems placed on hold during their absence. In addition, several of the states responded to the rec9. The original SSCRA of 1918 specifically listed in the definition section the Officers'
and Enlisted Reserve Corps, all officers and enlisted men of the National Guard, National
Guard Reserve, and the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Bill: Hearings and Memoranda Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary,65th
Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 9 (1917) [hereinafter 1917 Hearings].
10. When the SSCRA was passed in 1918 and then re-enacted in 1940, a separate and
distinct United States Air Force did not exist. The Air Force as we know it today came into
being under the National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 508 (1947). All military
aircraft prior to that date were owned and operated by the United States Army Air Corps
and the United States Navy. Marine Corps aircraft were controlled by the Department of
the Navy. In 1991 the Air Force was added as a technical amendment. Pub. L. No. 102-12, §
9(1)(A), 105 Stat. 34, 39 (1991). Members of the Air Force have always enjoyed the same
protection as members of the other services. They have merely received their just billing
after 44 years.
11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 213(e) (1991).
12. 33 U.S.C.A. § 857-3(a)(3) (1986).
13. 1917 Hearings,supra note 9, at 53-74 (Appendix D, Certain State "Stay Laws" of
the Civil War).
14. Act of June 11, 1864, ch. 118, 13 Stat. 123.
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ogriized needs of the soldier and enacted their own laws providing special
protections.1"
B.

SSCRA of 1918

During World War I, Professor John Wigmore was activated and appointed a Major in the Army Judge Advocate General Corps ("JAGC").
He headed a task force to draft a soldiers' and sailors' relief bill for Congress. 16 Congress enacted Professor Wigmore's mammoth work in the
form of the SSCRA of 1918. The SSCRA of 1918 terminated under its
own provision six months after the war. 17
C. SSCRA of 1940
When the clouds of war appeared on the horizon once again in 1940,
Congress re-enacted the SSCRA almost verbatim.1 8 After Pearl Harbor,
however, the new social and business realities of a different era demonstrated that a major update was necessary. Major William Partlow, Army
JAGC, headed a team which drafted major revisions of the SSCRA that
were enacted into law in 1942. Since the 1942 revisions, Congress has
amended the SSCRA eleven times.19
15. 1917 Hearings,supra note 9, at 53-74, provides a survey of all the states that enacted
laws protecting soldiers and sailors. It is interesting to note that many were Confederate
states responding to the SSCRA passed by Congress protecting Union soldiers.
16. The following dialogue transpired after Major Wigmore was introduced by Secretary
of War, Newton D. Baker, at the 1917 Hearings:

Senator Overman. Major, you are a lawyer yourself?
Major Wigmore. Yes, sir.
Senator Overman. You are the author of a great book on evidence, Wigmore on
Evidence: and now you are in the Judge Advocate General's Office, under appointment from civil life, with rank as major?
Major Wigmore. Yes, sir ....
1917 Hearings,supra note 9, at 83-84.
17. Act of March 8, 1918, ch. 20, § 602, 40 Stat. 440, 449.
18. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act: Hearings on H.R. 7029 Before the Committee
on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1942) (statement of Major William D. Partlow, JAGC) [hereinafter 1942 Hearings]. A few minor
changes were made, as found in § 6, Staying of Actions, of the SSCRA of 1918, which provided that "unless, in the opinion of the court, the defendant is not embarrassed by reason
of his military service." 1917 Hearings,supra note 9, at 13. The term "embarrassed" was
changed to "materially affected" in 1940. S. Rep. No. 4270, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1940).
19. Lt. Colonel Gregory M. Huckabee, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Resurrectionof the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 132 MIL. L. R.v. 141, 155-57 (1991).
The eleventh amendment effort occurred when President Bush signed the latest series of
amendments on March 18, 1991. Id.
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III. 1991 AMENDMENTS
As the events surrounding Operation Desert Storm unfolded (Operation Desert Storm incorporated Operation Desert Shield), it became clear
that the SSCRA needed amending in certain areas. Many provisions that
had offered protection to servicemembers seventy years ago were hopelessly out of date in 1991. Congress responded to a call from the Armed
Services for emergency assistance.
A.

Eviction Protection

One section needing amendment was the provision designed to protect
servicemembers from eviction from rental property without first obtaining a court order.' 0 Section 530 of 50 United States Code appendix
("U.S.C. app.") provides the servicemember and his dependents with protection from an eviction or distress' 1 without a court order during the
servicemember's period of military service."2 The premises protected
must be occupied for dwelling purposes, not business uses. Although this
section was one of the few that Congress updated over the years, prior to
1991 Congress had not updated the section in over twenty-five years."3
Before the 1991 amendments, the section protected a servicemember's
rental property only if the monthly rental did not exceed $150. While this
figure had not been strictly enforced by some courts since the 1970s,
when rampant inflation and soaring real estate values made the figure
unrealistically low,"4 it remained law until Congress passed an amendment raising the minimum rent level to $1,200." The new amount was an
attempt to provide broad coverage by protecting servicemembers in areas
with high costs of living, such as Alaska or Washington, D.C.
20. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 530 (1990).
21. Distress is defined as "[a] common-law right of landlord, now regulated by statute, to
seize a tenant's goods and chattels in a nonjudicial proceeding to satisfy an arrears of rent,"
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 426 (5th ed. 1983).
22. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 530 (1990).

23. This section was in the original Act of 1918 when the rent protection level was only
$50. The next time Congress adjusted the amount was in 1942 to $80. Twenty-four years
later, in 1966, Congress raised the rent protection level to $150, where it has remained until
the 1991 amendments increased the level to $1,200. As this historical progression illustrates,
50 U.S.C. app. § 530 is rarely updated. This makes applying the section difficult, if not
useless, as a protection for the needy servicemember as a specific amount becomes outdated
with the passage of time.
24. In Balconi v. Drascas, 507 N.Y.S.2d 788 (City Ct. 1986), the court held that the
tenant was entitled to the protection of the SSCRA even though her monthly rent exceeded
the $150 figure established in 1966. Id. at 790. The court reasoned that the tenant's monthly
rent of $340 was modest in 1986 and, if inflation were taken into account, she lived in

quarters at a rental value slightly less than $150 in terms of 1966 dollars. Id.
25.

Pub. L. No. 120-12, § 2, 105 Stat. 34 (1991).
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B. Stay of Proceeding
Another section needing immediate attention was 50 U.S.C.A. app. §
521, which provides for a stay of proceeding. Since the SSCRA of 1918,
the stay provision has allowed servicemembers to postpone a court response or appearance due to their inability to focus on the case or controversy because of their military service.27 Due to Operation Desert Storm,
Congress responded to servicemembers' modern needs by creating an automatic stay provision. Upon application, the provision stayed judicial actions or proceedings (other than criminal proceedings) until a date after
June 30, 1991.28 The amendment was only temporary, however, and expired by its own terms on July 1, 1991. The provision was intended to
protect servicemembers from adverse judgments taken against them in
their absence. During the time the amendment was in effect, from August
1, 1990 through June 30, 1991, a servicemember, whether a plaintiff or
defendant, had only to request a stay from the court and it would be
granted.2 ' The amendment placed one restriction on receiving an automatic stay. The servicemember had to be serving outside the state in
which the court having jurisdiction over the action was located. 0
Prior to the 1991 amendment, section 521 required a demonstration
that "the ability of (the] plaintiff to prosecute the action or the defendant
to conduct his defense is not materially affected by reason of his military
service" before a court would grant a stay of proceeding 1 While courts
have not established a bright line standard to show material effect, they
focus on two main concerns when trying to determine if a servicemember
is materially effected by military service. First, courts determine whether
26. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 521 (1990).
27. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 521 (1990) provides:
At any stage thereof any action or proceeding in any court in which a person in
military service is involved, either as plaintiff or defendant, during the period of
such service or within sixty days thereafter may, in the discretion of the court in
which it is pending, on its own motion, and shall, on application to it by such
person or some person on his behalf, be stayed as provided in this Act, unless, in
the opinion of the court, the ability of plaintiff to prosecute the action or the
defendant to conduct his defense is not materially affected by reason of his military service.
Id.

28. Pub. L. No. 102-12, § 6, 105 Stat. 34, 37-38 (1991).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 6(b)(2), 105 Stat. at 38. Potentially, this could have effects unintended by the
drafters. A servicemember living in southern California or west Texas could have an extremely long drive to the other end of the state and still have to appear in court as directed.
On the other hand, a servicemember living just across the state boundary, five minutes from
the court, would have the protection of the SSCRA's stay provision.
31. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 521 (1990).
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the servicemember has suffered an economic impairment due to the transition from civilian to military life. s" The courts normally evaluate the
difference between pre-service and in-service income. 33 Second, the courts
determine whether the servicemember has suffered a geographic disadvantage due to military duty assignment or if the servicemember's rights
would be adversely effected by virtue of his absence.' The 1991 amendment did not require the servicemember to show "material affect" to ob3
tain a stay between the dates of August 1, 1990 and June 30, 1991. 5 It

was presumed, as a matter of legislative policy, that Congress did not intend the servicemember to show material effect given the servicemember's participation in the largest deployment of Reserve Component and National Guard personnel since World War II. Stay provisions
after June 30, 1991 are no longer granted automatically, and again require
a showing of "material affect," as mandated before the 1991 amendment
was enacted.
C. Professional Liability Insurance
The SSCRA was completely silent in the area of professional liability
insurance. As large numbers of medical personnel were ordered to active
duty, problems involving insurance arose, and the need for some form of
protection became urgent. In their civilian practices, reserve and National
Guard health care providers had to maintain required liability insurance
policies at all times in order to maintain claims coverage. For many, the
cost of maintaining these policies became prohibitive on their military
salary. A civilian doctor with a thriving medical practice ordered to active
duty will probably serve in the rank of a Major or Lieutenant Commander. This pay grade may create an income reduction of over one-half
or more of his civilian salary. Congress permanently amended the SSCRA
with a new section" allowing individuals engaged in furnishing health
care or other services, determined by the Secretary of Defense to be professional services, to suspend payment of liability insurance premiums
during their period of active duty.-7 Additionally, the insurer must either
32. See Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Deziel, 136 F. Supp. 859 (E.D. Mich. 1956).

33. Id.
34. See Hackman v. Postel, 675 F. Supp. 1132 (N.D. Il1.1988); Palo v. Palo, 299 N.W.2d
577 (S.D. 1980).
35. Pub. L. No. 102-12, § 6, 105 Stat. 34, 37-38 (1991).
36. Id., § 4, 105 Stat. at 34-36 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 592).
37. Id. § 4(a)(2)(A). The Secretary of Defense has not yet defined the boundaries of this
protection. It is expected, however, that reserve and guard attorneys ordered to active duty
are also eligible for this protection. The practice of law is considered a "profession" and, as
such, the Secretary of Defense's definition should include attorneys within the category of a
"professional service."
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refund premiums already paid for the suspended period or apply those
premiums to the policy upon reinstatement if the insured so elects.3,
To qualify for this protection, the servicemember must have had in effect a professional liability insurance policy that does not continue to
cover claims filed during the period of the servicemember's active duty
unless premiums are paid for the coverage.5s Under this new section, the.
servicemember is entitled to reinstatement of the liability insurance policy at the previous rate upon completion of active duty.'0 The insurers,
however, are not liable for claims based on the professional conduct of the
servicemember during the period of active duty.'" The United States government assumes responsibility for those claims under the Federal Tort
Claims Act."2

D. Powers of Attorney

Congress also extended protection in the section regarding powers of
attorney.'3 Generally, this section provides that a power of attorney executed by a servicemember who enters missing status is extended during
the period the servicemember is in that status." This amendment auto-.
matically extends indefinitely the termination date of a power of attorney
for the period of time a servicemember is in a missing status, providing
38. Id. § 4(a)(2)(B).
39. This type of coverage is referred to as a "claims-made" policy. Claims-made policies
are the most common form of medical malpractice insurance and insures the policyholder
only so long as the premiums are paid. If the policyholder allows the policy to lapse, the
professional is unprotected against malpractice claims filed during the period coverage is not
in effect. The other type of policy is known as an occurrence policy, which provides coverage
for a malpractice claim occurring during a specified policy period, regardless of whether the
policy is in effect at the time the claim is filed. The servicemember who maintains a claimsmade policy is most at risk if her premiums are unpaid during her active duty and a malpractice claim is filed. The 1991 amendments remedy this dilemma.
40. Pub. L. No. 102-12, § 4, 105 Stat. 34, 35-36 (1991) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §
592). The subsection also indicates that the servicemember must pay any increase occurring
naturally through the passage of time and applied equally to all civilian nonreservist policyholders similarly situated. Id.
41. Id. § 4(b)(2)(B).
42. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2402, 2671, 2672, 2674-2680 (1988). When a servicemember is
acting within the scope and course of employment and accidently or negligently injures
someone, the injured party may file a claim against the United States government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). Under the FTCA, the government agrees to waive its
sovereign immunity and receive tort claims as a defendant. The government either pays the
claim, or some agreed part thereof, or denies the claim in full. If denied, the injured party
may then file suit in federal district court. Id.
43. Pub. L. No. 102-12, § 3, 105 Stat. 34 (1991) (amending 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 591
(1990)).
44. Id. Prior to the 1991 amendments, this section applied only to powers of attorney
executed during the Vietnam era. Pub. L. No. 92-540, § 504(2), 86 Stat. 1098 (1972).
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the "power of attorney.

. .

expire[d] by its terms after July 31, 1990." 4

Thus, powers of attorney executed after Desert Storm commenced by servicemembers who are in a missing status will remain in effect past the
stated expiration date. To illustrate, if a servicemember executed a power
of attorney on August 1, 1990 that expired on January 1, 1991, and became reported as missing" - anytime before January 1, the power of attorney would remain valid for the duration of the servicemember's missing
status. The only exception is if the document clearly indicates the power
of attorney expires on a specified date, even though that person, after
7
executing the document, enters missing status.
E.

Adverse Actions

Due to the large number of reservists and National Guardsmen ordered
to duty, concern arose in Congress that servicemembers may be subject to
adverse actions by creditors and insurers if they requested relief under
the SSCRA. To prevent this, Congress drafted and enacted a new section
to prohibit retaliatory action."

Specifically, the new section provides that a servicemember's actual or
potential request for relief under the SSCRA shall not itself be the basis
for a denial or revocation of credit, an adverse change by the creditor in
the terms of an existing credit arrangement, or an adverse report relating
to the credit-worthiness of a servicemember to any person or entity engaged in assembling or evaluating consumer credit information." A creditor may not make a determination that the servicemember is unable to
pay the civil obligation or liability in accordance with its terms.'0 Furthermore, a creditor may not refuse to grant credit to a servicemember in
substantially the amount or for substantially the terms that the creditor
offers to civilians who are similarly situated.51 Finally, an insurer may not
refuse to insure a servicemember based solely on the servicemember's actual or potential assertion of rights under the SSCRA.5 2 To illustrate, a
creditor may not make an adverse notation in a servicemember's credit
record because the servicemember requested application of 50 U.S.C.A.
45. Pub. L. No. 102-12, § 3, 105 Stat. 34 (1991).
46. 37 U.S.C. § 551(2) (1988) (defining "missing status").
47. Pub. L. No. 102-12, § 3, 105 Stat. 34 (1991).
48. Pub. L,No. 102-12, § 7, 105 Stat. 34, 38 (1991) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §

518).
49. Id.

50. Id.
51. Id.
52.

Id.
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app. § 526's58 six percent interest cap protection and failed to pay the

contract rate of interest.
F.

Technical Changes

In addition to the substantive amendments, Congress added several
purely technical amendments. Most of these amendments are meant to
update the SSCRA's language and bring the grammatical usage in line

with current legislative drafting practice."
IV. COMMON PITFALLS

Despite the characterization by the United States Supreme Court of
the SSCRA as "so carefully drawn as to leave little room for conjecture," 55 a plethora of case law regarding a number of provisions has arisen
since the SSCRA's inception that might cause the Court to reconsider its
position.
A.

Default Judgments

The default protection has confused a number of unwary practitioners
into believing it can be exercised in conjunction with the stay protection
of 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 521." Specifically, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 520*1 permits
the reopening of a default judgment against a servicemember provided
the servicemember made no appearance and has "a meritorious or legal
defense to the action or some part thereof."" On its face, section 521
53. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 526 (1990).
54. Congress made technical changes to 27 sections of the SSCRA. These amendments
ranged from inserting "the Air Force" into section 511's definitions, to replacing "Administrator of Veterans' Affairs" with "Secretary of Veterans Affairs" in sections 541 through 545.
Pub. L. No. 102-12, § 9, 105 Stat. 34, 39-40 (1991).
55. Ebert v. Poston, 266 U.S. 548, 554 (1924).
56. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 521 (1990).
57. Id. § 520.
58. Id. Section 520, on default judgments, provides in pertinent part the following
protections:
(1) In any action or proceeding commenced in any court, if there shall be a default
of any appearance by the defendant, the plaintiff, before entering judgment shall
file in the court an affidavit setting forth facts showing that the defendant is not
in military service. If unable to file such affidavit plaintiff shall in lieu thereof file
an affidavit setting forth either that the defendant is in the military service or that
plaintiff is not able to determine whether or not defendant is in such service. If an
affidavit is not filed showing that the defendant is not in military service, no judgment shall be entered without first securing an order of court directing such entry,
and no such order shall be made if the defendant is in such service until after the
court shall have appointed an attorney to represent defendant and protect his
interest, and the court shall on application make such appointment. Unless it ap-
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appears to allow a servicemember who receives notice of a pending action
-to contact the court and request a stay because of an inability to appear
due to military service. 9 If the request is denied, some servicemembers
(and some counsel) erroneously believe section 520's default protection is
still available to reopen the default judgment taken against the servicemember in his or her absence.
It must be remembered that both the default and stay sections were
incorporated virtually verbatim into the 1940 SSCRA from the 1918
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act." Major (Professor) John Wigmore,
on leave from serving as Dean of Northwestern School of Law, devised
this specific protection in 1918. Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary regarding the default protection
provision, Major Wigmore observed:
Our greatest mechanical difficulty in the whole system is to get to the
attention of the court the fact that a man-and there are thousands of
absent men-is one of this class of persons, and that is what sections 4
[Representation], 5 [Defaults], and 6 [Staying of Actions] are built up to
arrange. Having brought that fact to the attention of the court, and the
court having appointed an attorney, we come to the question whether a
judgment rendered then could possibly hurt the soldier. We say yes, bepears that the defendant is not in such service the court may require, as a condition before judgment is entered, that the plaintiff file a bond approved by the
court conditioned to indemnify the defendant, if in military service, against any
loss or damage that he may. suffer by reason of any judgment should the judgment
be thereafter set aside in whole or part. And the court may make such other and
further order or enter such judgment as in its opinion may be necessary to protect
the rights of the defendant under this Act ....
I ..(3) In any action or proceeding in which a person in military service is a
party if such party does not personally appear therein or is not represented by an
authorized attorney, the court may appoint an attorney to represent him; and in
such case a like bond may be required and an order made to protect the rights of
such person. But no attorney appointed under this Act to protect a person in
military service shall have power to waive any right of the person for whom he is
appointed or bind him by his acts.
(4) If any judgment shall be rendered in any action or proceeding governed by this
section against any person in military service during the period of such service or
within thirty days thereafter, and it appears that such person was prejudiced by
reason of his military service in making his defense thereto, such judgment may,
upon application, made by such person or his legal representative, not later than
ninety days after the termination of such service, be opened by the court rendering the same and such defendant or his legal representative let in to defend; provided it is made to appear that the defendant has a meritorious or legal defense to
the action or some part thereof.
Id.
59. Id. § 521.
60. See 1942 Hearings,supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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cause, although the court may do its best in appointing an attorney, a
large majority of these affairs lie in the personality of the man himself.
He is not there and has not had a chance to explain his case to his attorney, and in spite of all that has been done the judgment is passed."
Confusion Between Default and Stay Protections. The salient
point is that the default protection was designed to protect a servicemember from actions when no notice or opportunity to present a defense occurs. Under these circumstances, notions of substantial fairness
and equity cry out for relief against such proceedings in the form of reopening a default judgment in which no appearance has been made and a
meritorious or legal defense exists.
Herein lies the first pitfall. As mentioned earlier, this protection was
designed for no-notice actions. If the servicemember receives notice of an
action, then the stay provision of section 5216s is the appropriate remedy.
In other words, the default and stay protections were designed for two
mutually exclusive situations: the default protection for no-notice actions
and the stay protection for actions in which the servicemember receives
notice. All too often servicemembers and counsel confuse the two protections and read them together, believing that if the court denies their request for a stay, they will always have the default protection to fall back
on. This is not so.
Appearance. The second pitfall is the issue of appearance. If a servicemember makes an appearance of any kind, whether special or general,
the servicemember will be disqualified from exercising the default protection of section 520 because one of the requirements of the protection is
that no appearance be made. 3 The typical situation occurs when the servicemember communicates with the court in some manner requesting relief. The court denies the relief and announces that the servicemember
has made an appearance in the action and now must proceed or face an
adverse judgment. If a default judgment is entered, the servicemember is
unable to reopen the judgment under section 520 (default provision) because an appearance was made. In Blankenship v. Blankenship,6 ' defendant's counsel filed an affidavit asking the court to either quash the complaint and the service or continue the cause." The court held that the

61. See 1917 Hearings,supra note 9, at 96 (statement of Major John H. Wigmore).
62. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 521 (1990).
63. Id. § 520(1); Major Garth K. Chandler, Impact of a Request for Stay Under the

Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 102 MIL. L. REv. 169 (1983).
64. 82 So. 2d 335 (Ala. 1955).

65. Id. at 337.
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servicemember made an appearance, thus depriving the servicemember of
the protection to reopen the judgment offered by section 520. es
Similarly, in Reynolds v.Reynolds, 6 defendant's counsel filed a motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction."8 Once again the procedural "catch 22"
was inflicted and counsel's request was deemed an appearance and deprived the servicemember of the protection of section 520.9 Ohio courts
followed this same pattern in Vara v. Vara,7 in which a defendant ser71
vicemember filed a motion to quash service and was similarly deprived.
The most painful experience for a servicemember seeking protection occurred in Skates v. Stocktons when a legal assistance attorney sent a
letter to a trial court invoking the SSCRA and requesting a stay.78 The
court deemed the action to constitute an appearance, thus denying the
servicemember the opportunity to reopen the default judgment under
section 520. 74 As these cases illustrate, the appearance issue is a serious
problem to invocation of either the default or stay protections.
Waiver of Defenses. Another pitfall lies in the area of waiver of defenses. There is substantial confusion among courts regarding whether a
stay request under section 521 may constitute a waiver of a procedural or
legal defense. In Kramer v. Kramers a defendant servicemember's letter
invoking the SSCRA and requesting a stay was held not to provide personal jurisdiction that otherwise was lacking.76 However, in Artis-Wergin
v.Artis-Wergin7 the court held the letter requesting a stay also served
as an appearance and thus waived the issue of personal jurisdiction.7
B. Problems With The Six Percent Interest Cap
Perhaps the most utilized SSCRA provision by National Guard and Reserve Component personnel during Operation Desert Storm was the six
66. Id, at 340.
67. 134 P.2d 251 (Cal. 1943).
68. Id. at 253.
69. Id. at 255.
70. 171 N.E.2d 384 (Ohio 1961).
71. Id. at 392.
72. 683 P.2d 304 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
73. Id. at 305.
74. Id. at 306. Pursuant to regulations issued by each of the military services, legal assistance attorneys are barred from representing clients in state court actions. See 32 C.F.R. §
818(b) (1991) (Air Force); 32 C.F.R. § 516 (1991) (Army); 32 C.F.R. § 727 (1991) (Navy).
75. 668 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
76. Id.at 458.
77. 444 N.W.2d 750 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
78. Id. at 753; see also 62 A.L.R.2d 938 (1958).
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percent interest cap provision provided by 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 526.7 This
provision prohibits a creditor from charging interest in excess of six percent on all indebtedness incurred prior to active duty.0s It does not apply
to new indebtedness incurred while on active duty.s '
The six percent interest protection was added to the SSCRA in 1942
when Congress realized the SSCRA contained no provision that prevented an accumulation of excess interest on servicemembers' indebtedness.ss Congress was genuinely concerned about prevailing interest rates
at which citizens had to borrow money or obtain credit during the Depression era. Referring to this problem on the floor of the House of Representatives, Military Affairs Committee member Overton Brooks (D-La.)
addressed the issue by observing that the bill:
covers the case of the soldier who has entered into an obligation to pay
interest, which in some States runs as high as 3 1/2 percent per month,
and which interest during his absence will accumulate far beyond the
value of the property by which it is secured. This bill provides no inter6 percent per annum and thereby
est charge during service shall exceed
3
gives full protection to the soldier.
It is understandable that the burden of the national defense should be
shared and not shouldered exclusively by soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines as a matter of public policy. True burden-sharing then, as today,
means that the business community must bear part of the sacrifice of the
national effort. While the purpose of the protection and the legislative
intent indicate Congress sought to lower servicemembers' expenses after
entering active duty, implementation of the protection was left ambiguous, and clear guidance for creditors was lacking.' The only reference in
the provision to creditor action concerns a creditor's right to seek a court
79. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 526 (1990).
80.
81.
82.
Sess.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
H.R. REP. No. 2198, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1942); S. REP. No. 1558, 77th Cong., 2d
4 (1942).
88 CONG. REc. H5369 (1942) (statement of Rep. Brooks).
The section reads as follows:
No obligation or liability bearing interest at a rate in excess of 6 percent per year
incurred by a person in military service before that person's entry into that service
shall, during any part of the period of military service bear interest at a rate in
excess of 6 percent per year unless, in the opinion of the court, upon application
thereto by the obligee, the ability of such person in military service to pay interest
upon such obligation or liability at a rate in excess of 6 percent per year is not
materially affected by reason of such service, in which case the court may make
such order as in its opinion may be just. As used in this section the term "interest" includes service charges, renewal charges, fees, or any other charges (except
bona fide insurance) in respect of such obligation or liability.
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order relieving the creditor of the obligation to lower the interest rate on
the servicemember's indebtedness if the creditor believed the servicemember's ability to pay the obligation was not materially effected by
the servicemember's military service.85
While the credit business community responded magnanimously to the
Armed Services' and the Congressional Research Service's interpretation
that the difference between the six percent interest cap and the contract
rate is to be forgiven not reamortized, ss there always exist a few financial
predators who attempt to take advantage or construe ambiguity to their
advantage regardless of the national interest involved.s7 Some financial
institutions have taken the position that the difference in interest should
be reamortized, or the principal portion increased, leaving the payment
total the same." Clearly, such action defeats the purpose of the provision.
Even the House Military Affairs Committee observed this capitalistic predilection when in 1917 it noted in its Committee Report on the overall
SSCRA bill:
The Shylock, to whom his pound of flesh is dearer than patriotism, is not
the only man against whom the soldier must be given relief. Much more
numerous are cases where, between the soldier and his creditor, there is
an honest difference of opinion as to the proper division of the burden
which the war brings to all in a greater or less degree. The letters which
have come to the committee ... show that this is a real menace and can
not be left to care for itself. The need for this protection is urgent. It is
immediate ....
These men should know what is to be done for them. It
needs no argument to show that freedom from harassing debts will make
them better and more effective, more eager soldiers than if their loyalty

Pub. L. No. 102-12, § 9(7), 105 Stat. 34, 39 (1991) (amending 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 526 (1990)).
This brief section paragraph provides no guidance as to how the six percent protection can
be obtained by servicemembers or implemented by creditors.
85. Id. Furthermore, reality dictates that businesses are not going to try and reclaim
pennies when their public goodwill is at stake.
86. Congressional Research Service Memorandum, The Interest Rate Cap of the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, as amended (Aug. 27, 1990) (copies available
from American Law Division).
87. Major James P. Pottorff, Contemporary Applications of the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act, 132 MIL. L. REv. 115, 131-33 (1991).
88. One Desert Shield-Storm case involving the six-percent cap never went to trial.
In United States ex rel. Bennett v. American Home Mortgage, a mortgage company in New Jersey agreed to reduce interest payments on an activated National

Guard sergeant's mortgage to six percent, but required continued payments at the
preactive service total. When the United States Attorney presented the legislative
history of section 526, the mortgage company entered into a consent agreement

detailing compliance consistent with the above Department of Defense
interpretation.

Id. at 132 n.106.
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and zeal is tempered with the knowledge that their country, which demands the supreme sacrifice from them, grudges a small measure of protection to their families and homes."
While the Armed Services informed Reserve Component personnel of
SSCRA protections available to them upon activation, the Armed Services went further to fill in several of the gaps left in the six percent
interest cap provision. The Legal Assistance Division in the Office of the
Judge Advocate General of each military service department disseminated guidance that servicemembers seeking the interest cap protection
had an obligation to inform their creditors in writing of their order to
active duty together with a copy of their military orders and a request for
application of the interest cap protection. In many cases, form letters
were provided to military personnel at in-processing stations,90
Despite best efforts, local creditors knew little, if anything, about this
provision of the SSCRA because its last widespread use occurred during
World War 11.91 If the law requires notice, then this requirement has yet
to be effectively fulfilled in the financial community. It is unrealistic and
futile, based on the recent experience of the largest activation of reservists and National Guardsmen since World War II, to presume that members of the judiciary, the bar, and business at large are aware of this provision and how it applies to servicemembers and creditors alike.
Therefore, this provision remains the chief candidate for revision when
Congress once again updates the SSCRA to meet contemporary conditions and provide policy guidance.
C. Enforcement Possibilities
Some legal practitioners observe that the SSCRA contains few enforcement provisions. This leads some to conclude that when no sanction is
provided, ignorance is at least invited. In reality, when it comes to caring
for those who must go in harm's way to protect the national interest, all
the king's horses and all the king's men are available to take whatever
action is appropriate concerning a given SSCRA infraction.
In the same manner that the Department of Veterans Affairs is charged
with responsibility for enforcement of the Veterans Re-employment
Rights Law, 92 the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense
89. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF BILL, H.R. REP
No. 181, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1917), reprinted in 1917 Hearings, supra note 9, at 153.
90. See Lt. Colonel Gregory M. Huckabee, Legal Assistance for Those Who Go in
Harm's Way, MIL. REV., April 1991, at 33; Dale Ellis, Give Credit Where Credit is Due, THE
COMPLEAT LAWYER, Spring 1991, at 19.
91. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.

92. 38 U.S.C.A. § 2025 (1991).
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exercise responsibility for securing the SSCRA protections.'" While the
prospect of resorting to the courts is always an available option," the
more effective enforcement tool is a complaint to a military installation's
Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board. Each military installation has
an administrative board that conducts investigations of complaints. If the
board determines that an organization or business is acting contrary to
law, it may recommend that the installation commander place the organization off-limits to military personnel. After a commander takes such action, it becomes a military offense for servicemembers to transact any
business with an off-limits organization.'" Furthermore, a report of offlimits action taken is transmitted to the military service's headquarters in
Washington for review. If the infraction is egregious enough, it is possible
that the military service, as well as the other armed services, may place
the organization or business off-limits worldwide to military personnel."
Announcement of off-limits action through each Armed Service's Public
Affairs Office serves as yet another deterrence against cavalier adherence
to the purpose and spirit of the SSCRA. The negative public relations
impact resulting from such announcements rivets the attention of even
the largest corporations. In addition, complaints to state consumer commissions and secretary of state offices issuing licenses can also have reme7
dial effects .
V.

LEGISLATIVE REPAIRS

Patchwork amendment repairs since 1942 have proven insufficient to
keep the SSCRA in step with the explosion of modem day technology
and societal demands and obligations. The original drafters could not
foresee what the world would look like seventy years later. However, our
inheritance of the SSCRA brings with it the obligation to keep it vibrant
93.

Memorandum from Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,

Dep't of Justice, to all United States Attorneys (Mar. 11, 1991) (discussing requests for
representation concerning the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act); Letter from Stuart M.
Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Dep't of Justice, to Terrence O'Donnell,
General Counsel, Dep't of Defense (Mar. 12, 1991).

94. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
95.
96.

32 C.F.R. § 631 (1991).
Id.

97. The general counsel of two large financial institutions transacting credit business in a
number of states indicated to The Office of the Judge Advocate General, Army Legal Assistance, that because of the six percent interest cap provision's ambiguity, they were not willing to forgive the difference in contract interest. When apprised of the Department of the
Army off-limits sanction possibility, they re-evaluated their company's policy position and
adopted the Department of Defense's interpretation over the telephone.
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and effective. Similar to Major Partlow's efforts in 1942, major revision of
the SSCRA must be undertaken to repair the armor that time has rusted.
A.

New Name

To begin, now that there is a new Uniform Service (the United States
Air Force), as well as a number of agencies covered by the SSCRA (for
example, Public Health Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration), the characterization of the SSCRA needs to be transformed into the Uniformed Services Civil Relief Act.
B. State Taxation of Servicemembers
Despite the clear prohibition in 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 57498 against a nondomiciliary state taxing the military income of a servicemember, several
states have used a servicemember's military compensation to increase the
tax liability of a spouse. The financial impact on a servicemember and his
family is inconsistent with the basic intent of this protection. In United
States v. Kansas,9 the state devised a taxation scheme that calculates
the tax bracket of a nonmilitary spouse who earned income in the state
by adding in the servicemember's military income if the couple filed a
joint federal return. 00 This scheme increases the servicemember's family
tax burden that Congress sought to prevent by section 574. Congress
should amend this section to eliminate confusion over the use of a servicemember's military income and to expressly prohibit application of
such state tax schemes that increase a military family's tax liability in
addition to that levied by their domiciliary state.
C. Reservists' Businesses and Professional Corporations
There is considerable confusion afoot with respect to whether the SSCRA's protections apply to a reservist's business or professional corporation. When an accountant or physician is ordered to active duty, they
may leave behind a business or corporation that is solely or partially dependent on their services. While they are away performing national service, no income is being generated at home, yet expenses need to be paid.
Some courts impute the SSCRA protections to a servicemember's business while others do not (for example, leases for business equipment or
space, and the six percent interest cap). Congress should create a new
section to protect reservists' businesses in the same way the SSCRA pro98, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 574 (1990), amended by Pub. L. No. 102-12, § 9(24), 105 Stat. 34,
41 (1991).
99. 810 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1987).
100. Id. at 936:
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vides protection for the individual reservist. The business community has
grown significantly more sophisticated and complex since the last major
revision in 1942.
D. Stay of Proceedings
The stay of proceedings protection has become illusory in that few servicemembers are able to take advantage of the protection of 50 U.S.C.A.
app. § 521. This occurred because of a common failure to provide trial
courts with sufficient information to make a finding of material effect of
military service upon the servicemember's ability to appear. Revitalization of this protection depends upon devising a mechanism that provides
judges with more information substantiating the reason servicemembers
cannot appear for a prospective hearing.
Understanding that a significant amount of litigation involving requests
for stays concern domestic relations cases, there is an urgent need to remedy the problem of a servicemember assigned overseas or on deployment
(like Desert Storm) who receives notice of an impending hearing weeks, if
not months, after it was mailed. With little or no time to respond from
foreign countries or while on deployment, and an insufficient ability to
communicate with, let alone retain, legal counsel to effectively represent
the servicemember in the action, some form of remedy is critically
needed.
If the servicemember fails to appear or obtain a stay, a default judgment will be entered and the servicemember will be prevented from reopening the judgment because of the disqualifications discussed earlier. 101
In this scenario, which is all too common, servicemembers receive no effective protection from the SSCRA, even though their military duty materially effects their ability to exercise their civil rights and effectively
represent their interests.
Dissatisfaction with the vague and ineffective language of section 521's
stay provision motivated Congress in early 1991 to pass temporary suspension of appearance requirements and create an automatic stay period
expiring June 30, 1991.102 Presumably, if Operation Desert Storm had
continued beyond that time, Congress would have extended this protection again for the same reasons. The 102d Congress recognized the shortcoming of this section as originally drafted in 1918 and the realities of
current legal process and military service.
Building on Congress' intent to provide some basic form of protection
against court action while servicemembers are deployed outside the state,
a ninety day automatic stay request is needed as a permanent change to
101.
102.

See supra text accompanying notes 62-78.
Pub. L. No. 102-12, § 6, 105 Stat. 34, 37-38 (1991).
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section 521. With delayed mail delivery endemic in military deployments,
and diminished opportunities to consult with legal counsel an inherent
reality, particularly in the case of ship deployments, overseas exercises,
and transfers to new units, a period of time is needed for servicemembers
to participate in the legal process, to have adequate opportunity to consult with military or civilian counsel, and to respond to the courts.
Such stays should be automatic if they meet several important criteria
that adequately place the court on notice of when a case may proceed.
First, an obligation should be placed on a servicemember to demonstrate
material effect by providing a factual basis for supporting the stay request.108 An important component of this requirement is the responsibility to provide an availability date that will assist the court in properly
docketing the case. 104 To assist courts in making factual determinations
on the material effect of military service on a member's ability to appear
in an action or proceeding, a definition of material effect needs to be included in 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 511105 to provide the courts with a discernible standard (such as geographic or economic disadvantage) by which to
judge.
In addition, a servicemember's unit commander should be required to
provide a letter affirming the unavailability of the servicemember to appear because of the adverse impact on the unit. Equipped with this information, the court can make a more informed judgment as to when the
litigation may proceed.le In the interim ninety day period, the servicemember is given not only an opportunity to retain and consult with
counsel, but also a reasonable period of time to help prepare a defense.
The issue of availability of military leave is an important consideration
affecting determination of a servicemember's ability to appear.10 7 By requiring a commander to specifically address this issue, the court is offi103. See Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561 (1943) (trial courts must use discretion in determining material effect based on facts presented); Plesniak v. Wiegand, 335 N.E.2d 131
(Ill. Ct. App. 1975) (party must establish that military service is proximate cause of inability
to appear); Lackey v. Lackey, 278 S.E.2d 811 (Va. 1981) (affidavit from the commander
revealing sailor was serving sea duty and unable to attend court sufficient to establish right
to a stay); Hibbard v. Hibbard, 431 N.W.2d 637 (Neb. 1988) (determination of a stay depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case).
104. See Tabor v. Miller, 389 F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1968) (servicemember did not provide
evidence it was impossible for him to appear); Zitomer v. Holdsworth, 449 F.2d 724 (3d Cir.
1971) (servicemember failed to avail himself of SSCRA provisions).
105. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 511 (1990).
106. See Hackman v. Postel, 675 F. Supp. 1132 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
107. See Underhill v. Barnes, 161 Ga. App. 776, 288 S.E,2d 905 (1982) (absence of facts
to obtain leave helped determine servicemember had not exercised due diligence or acted in
good faith to make himself available for trial).
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cially informed that personal leave is not available for the
servicemember.'"
Recognizing the current nature of military deployments, many of which
extend beyond ninety days, further requests for a stay need to be provided for in this section, and the same information discussed earlier 0 '
should be included in the requests. This will enable a court to factually
determine the material effect of a servicemember's ability to appear at a
prospective date. Unlike the initial application, this further stay request
would rely upon the trial court's discretion for approval. The court must
consider the equities of all parties involved in the litigation in granting an
additional stay and the material effect of military service upon the servicemember to effectively represent his or her interest. In doing so, the
courts should bear in mind congressional intent is that a servicemember's
military service should not place them at a geographic or economic
disadvantage.' 1 0
Another recommendation for improvement in section 521 is a requirement for appointment of counsel to protect the servicemembier's rights if
an additional stay request is denied. Also, a provision should be inserted
that provides a ninety day post-service transitional period similar to what
Congress has already provided in other SSCRA protections.
Congress should add a subsection which clarifies that once a servicemember has notice of the proceedings and invokes the relief provided
in this section, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 520's"I protections for default judgments may not subsequently be invoked. Section 520's protections are intended for those circumstances in which a servicemember receives no actual notice of an action or proceeding, or appointed counsel is unable to
communicate with the servicemember or even determine if a meritorious
or legal defense might exist. It is inappropriate and inconsistent with case
law to allow a servicemember two forms of relief, when each was initially
adopted
to protect
servicemembers
in mutually
exclusive
circumstances. " 2
E.

Six Percent Interest Cap Protection

Definitive clarification is needed to assist both servicemembers and
businesses in supporting national policy regarding the six percent interest
cap protection. First, Congress should address the forgiveness of interest
108. See Palo v. Palo, 299 N.W.2d 577 (S.D. 1980) (appellant failed to show leave was
unavailable or any attempt was made to obtain leave, and as a result, no protection was
afforded under the SSCRA).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 103-08.
110. See Keefe v. Spangenberg, 533 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Okla. 1981).
111. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 520 (1990).
112. See 1917 Hearings,supra note 9, at 96 (statement of Major John H. Wigmore).
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above the six percent cap in 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 526.113 The legislative
history of the 77th Congress provides support for a forgiveness clarification."' To take an opposite view, that Congress intended only to defer,
not to forgive, interest above the six percent protection, clearly places the
servicemember in precisely the same financial dilemma Congress sought
to ameliorate in 1942. Servicemembers could conceivably return from active duty with greater indebtedness than before they started.
Second, Congress should address how the interest cap is to be obtained.
The requirement for an application (that is, a letter) to invoke the six
percent protection needs to be stated. The original narrative provides the
servicemember no clear guidance on how it should be initiated and the
legislative history provides no insight. Logically, the burden should be on
the servicemember, or legal representative, to request application of the
six percent interest protection.
Third, Congress should require that a servicemember applying for the
interest cap protection should include a copy of military orders with the
request. The purpose is to officially place the creditor on notice that the
servicemember is ordered to duty in accordance with specific statutory
authority. The orders also indicate the period of time for which the servicemember is ordered to duty (for example, ninety or one hundred
eighty days). If there is an extension of the servicemember's duty obligation, the servicemember will be furnished amended orders extending the
time period. These orders should also be transmitted to the creditor so
the creditor's accounting nechanism can be appropriately programmed.
This approach not only provides guidance to the creditor on when and
how long the interest protection should be applied, but also places the
lender on official notice of the servicemember's activation and requires
the lender to act after receiving proper notice.
F. Eviction Protection
One section of the SSCRA in frequent need of updating is 50 U.S.C.A.
app. § 530, the "maximum rent" provision."' During the period of military service, this provision protects a servicemember and the ser113. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 526 (1990).
114. See H.R. REP. No. 2198, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1942).
115. The pre-1991 section and paragraph read as follows:
(1) No eviction or distress shall be made during the period of military service in
respect of any premises for which the agreed rent does not exceed $150 per month,
occupied chiefly for dwelling purposes by the wife, children, or other dependents
of a person in the military service, except upon leave of court granted upon application therefor or granted in an action or proceeding affecting the right of
possession.
50 U.S.C.A. app. § 530 (1990).
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vicemember's dependents from eviction without a court order if the
rental on the premises does not exceed a sum stated in the statute. Prior
to the March 1991 amendments, this figure was $150.110 The 1991 amendment to this section placed the figure at $1,200.117
A proposed change to this section would be to provide a sliding scale
based on the servicemember's housing allowances in addition to the fixed
sum recently amended. This addition would help protect servicemembers
and their dependents in the future, when $1,200 becomes unrealistically
low. Congress' heavy workload prevents revising this section as often as
necessary to make the needed amendments as rental rates go up. To
make this section effective in the future, this proposal provides an alternative to the fixed amount with one that increases yearly along with the
rental markets.
Another much needed update is in the area of personal property leases.
The way 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 531 currently reads, only leases "with a view
to purchase" are given protection from repossession or recision.'1
Amending language could be added that includes nonpurchase, closedend leases of personal property such as automobiles, business machines,
and farm and industrial equipment. The suggested addition would update
the protection of this section to reflect current realities and conform to
the original intent of Congress to provide materially effected servicemembers temporary relief from civil liabilities.11 9 The need for this
updated language is demonstrated by reservists ordered to active duty
who expressed two main areas of concern. The first concern arises when a
servicemember is leasing an automobile and is ordered to and sent to a
duty station where use of the automobile is impossible (like Saudi Arabia). As the section now reads, the servicemember must continue to pay
the monthly lease and the insurance premiums throughout the term of
the lease.
The second concern arises when the small businessowner has leased
equipment like a copier or FAX machine and is ordered to active duty.
The machines may go unused for extended periods of time, but the lease
116. Id.
117. See Pub. L. No. 120-12, § 2, 105 Stat. 34 (1991).
118. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 531 (1990), amended by Pub. L. No. 102-12, § 9, 105 Stat. 34, 40
(1991).
119. The legislative history of 1940 reveals the reason for amending 50 U.S.C.A. app. §
301(1) (1990) (50 U.S.C. app. § 531(1)) of the 1940 Act to include the term "lease," where it
had not been before, was to preclude contracts that attempt to circumvent the Act by providing for the lease of property for a period of time and later purchase at a certain price
exclusive of the lease payments. Lessor/creditor argued at that time that payments on the
lease under such a contract were not deposits or installments, and, therefore, not entitled to
the protection of this section. 1942 Hearings,supra note 18, at 17 (statement of Major John
Partlow).
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requires payment. Without the proposed amending language, relief under
section 531 may only be obtained if there was a clear "view to purchase"
the leased property. At the time this section was written in 1940 and
amended in 1942, closed-end leases of automobiles and business machines
were rare or non-existent.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Case law, seventy years of practical application, and the legion of active
and reserve servicemembers indicate that the SSCRA protective armor is
rusted and in sore need of repair. We now have a legislative window of
opportunity for improving and clarifying the SSCRA that may not come
this way again for another generation. Historically, during peacetime, military personnel problems enjoy a low priority on Congress' legislative
agenda. For the moment, as a result of the proficiency and professionalism demonstrated by the members of the Armed Forces, both active and
reserve, in Operation Desert Storm, Operation Provide Comfort, and the
Kuwait reconstruction effort, national attention is focused on the people
who have gone in harm's way on behalf of all Americans. Now is the time
to address these very real problems of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
and family members and request constructive attention. They answered
the call when the nation needed them. Now we need to provide in peacetime what we are willing to provide during war. Perhaps noted evidence
authority and World War I judge advocate John H. Wigmore characterized the issue at stake best when he observed: "'You drop everything you
have; drop all your relations and all your business affairs, and all the
property you have, and we will take you, and maybe your life.' We say to
him, 'Leave your family; leave your affairs, and sacrifice a great deal actually and sacrifice everything potentially.' M20'

120.

1917 Hearings, supra note 9, at 97.

